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F eminist empiricism draws in various ways on the philosophical tradition of empiri-cism, which can be defined as epistemol-
ogy that gives primary importance to knowledge 
based on experience. Feminist demands for atten-
tion to women’s experiences suggest that empiri-
cism can be a promising resource for developing 
a feminist account of knowledge. Yet feminists 
also value empiricism’s purchase on science and 
the empiricist view that knowers’ abilities depend 
on their experiences and their experiential histo-
ries, including socialization and psychological 
development.
This chapter explores the attractions of 
empiricism for feminists. Feminist empiricist 
analysis ranges from broad considerations about 
popular understandings to technical analysis of 
narrowly defined scientific fields. Whatever the 
scope, feminist reworkings of empiricism have 
two central themes. The first theme is the inter-
play among values in knowledge, especially 
connecting traditionally recognized empirical 
values, such as evidence and objectivity, with 
moral and political values. The interplay of these 
values undermines the traditional association of 
empirical knowledge with individual knowers, 
and the separation of individual knowledge from 
the politics of communities, by suggesting that 
the knower is not an isolated person. In this way, 
contesting the nature or locus of the knower and 
developing new accounts of agency in knowl-
edge emerges as the second theme in feminist 
empiricism.
Most feminist empiricists employ the meth-
odology for developing epistemology known as 
naturalized or naturalist epistemology. Naturalism 
is controversial, but it welcomes disputation, 
takes up new resources for epistemology on an 
ongoing basis, and encourages multiple approaches 
to the evaluation of knowledge. This pluralism 
undercuts naturalism’s and empiricism’s conser-
vative tendencies and imbues current formula-
tions of empiricism with radical potential.
Feminist AttrAction to empiricism
Empiricism traces in the philosophy of the 
global North as far back as Aristotle,1 but it is 
classically associated with the 18th-century 
British philosophers, John Locke, George 
Berkeley, and David Hume. Most recently the 
noteworthy empiricists include the logical 
empiricists as well as Willard Van Orman Quine 
and his naturalist followers. All empiricists 
emphasize the role of sensory experience in 
knowledge—evidence, data, and facts—and 
downplay the role of innate ideas and inborn 
mental capacities, which rationalists have his-
torically championed. Science provides especially 
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good examples of empirical knowledge, and most 
feminist empiricists focus on the types of knowl-
edge produced by science. Although feminists 
substantially revise empiricism, the traditional 
association remains attractive because of its rhe-
torical power to engage practicing scientists and 
academic philosophers. The naturalist form of 
empiricism also insists on attention to the social 
and physical embodiment of knowledge that 
concerns feminists.
Empiricism’s concern with identifying and 
making the most of the strengths of science pro-
vides feminists with a useful point of departure 
for theorizing about knowledge. Many of the 
early 20th-century logical empiricists aimed to 
develop a science that would serve social pur-
poses, including sociopolitical emancipation of 
various sorts; and so the goal of an emancipa-
tory science is part of the empiricist heritage 
(Okruhlik, 2003). Attention to the strengths of 
science supports the development of feminist 
“successor science projects” (Harding, 1986). 
Feminist experiences as scientists and feminist 
analyses of scientific problems orient most 
feminist empiricist analysis. Yet some feminist 
empiricists consider knowledge in a wider 
domain that includes everyday understanding 
and that draws on diverse sources of experience 
(Code, 2006a). The experiences from which we 
gain knowledge do not all arise from scientific 
methodology and may even include reading fic-
tion (Code, 2006b). This broad view of experi-
ence is congruent with Quine’s expansive notion 
of science that includes the experiential knowl-
edge of people with no special training (Haack, 
1993; Nelson, 1990).
Representing progressive concerns and lib-
eratory values in empiricist terms is rhetorically 
powerful, providing persuasive force and thus 
strategic advantage that eludes more explicitly 
progressive or revolutionary theories. Scientists 
and Anglo-American philosophers of science 
tend to conceive of science in empiricist terms, 
and the public understanding of science follows 
suit. In both these rarefied and commonplace 
contexts, using the terminology of “facts” 
(Code, 2006a), “evidence” (Nelson, 1993), and 
“objectivity” (Longino, 1990) provides a valu-
able discursive authority.
Because of empiricism’s historical centrality 
to the philosophy of science in the global North, 
feminist empiricism is analogous to liberal 
feminism. Both revise traditionally accepted 
approaches to the problems at hand: empiri-
cist approaches to scientific knowledge and 
liberal approaches to democratic politics, 
respectively.2 The political mainstream and the 
culture of science give less currency to more 
contested socialist, post-structuralist, and post-
colonial theoretical orientations (Harding, 
1989). Yet traditional rhetoric can convey radi-
cal ideas, and, when it does, it can be far more 
powerful than the more obviously revolution-
ary approaches. Therefore, a radical future can 
emerge from feminist empiricism just as Zillah 
Eisenstein argued it does from liberal feminism 
(Harding, 1986; Tuana, 1992).
The rhetorical advantage can be strategically 
essential because it allows feminists to transform 
the power of science.
The point of feminist science criticism must, in the 
end, be to change science, and changing science 
requires changing the practices of scientists. Hence, 
scientists must be brought into the dialogue. Since 
scientists are empiricists, that dialogue will have to 
make room, at least in the beginning, for empiri-
cists and for, at least as a topic of discussion, 
empiricism. (Nelson, 1990, pp. 6–7)
Appealing to the traditional empirical valuation 
of experience and logic provides a strategic 
advantage for feminism. Yet, feminists must 
rework empiricism and our understanding of 
what constitutes scientific standards in order to 
account for the role of sociopolitical values, as 
must the not-specifically feminist promoters of 
the empiricist tradition.
Many feminist epistemologists gain inspira-
tion from a late 20th-century development of 
empiricism known as “naturalized” or “natural-
ist” epistemology. Naturalists’ attention to the 
situation of human physical and cultural embodi-
ment abandons abstract ideals of knowledge that 
assume an omniscient god’s-eye view of val-
ues or ideals, such as knowledge and justice, 
and provides a concrete account of epistemic 
agency—who knows. The same approaches that 
naturalists reject on empiricist grounds feminists 
reject for being implicitly masculine: disassoci-
ating ideal understanding from the material 
realities of human existence excludes or at best 
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further marginalizes typical or traditional wom-
en’s ways of engaging the world in the global 
North and conflicts with the dominant ideals of 
femininity. Women’s experience and knowledge 
claims gain credibility from their grounding in 
material and empirical resources for understand-
ing. Naturalism suggests that new ways to 
address and redress the traditional Western dis-
counting of these forms of understanding can be 
found in scientific and historical accounts of 
knowledge (Hundleby, 2002).
Thus, feminist epistemologists, whether or 
not they consider themselves naturalists or even 
empir icists, probably demonstrate most thor-
oughly the use of empirical data to scrutinize 
science, which is the method of philosophical 
epistemology that naturalists recommend. 
Feminist naturalists especially—like any natural-
ists—appropriate science to provide accounts of 
knowledge; however, as Phyllis Rooney (2003) 
argues, feminist naturalism extends to reflexive 
examinations of the underlying motivations and 
worldviews of the social and individual cognitive 
sciences. Back ground assumptions—about the 
nature of gender as a dimension for investigating 
knowledge, for instance—are not merely noted 
but subject to challenge (Rooney, 2003, p. 226).
the spectrum oF Feminist  
empiricist AnAlysis
Scientific knowledge is popularly considered to 
be the best of human empirical inquiry, the most 
systematic and responsible way to make sense of 
experience. Yet feminist responsibility requires 
attention to how sexism, racism, and other forms 
of oppression manifest in scientific understand-
ing, in the very context of scientific theories and 
claims. Sexism appears, for instance, in cellular 
biology, as part of accounts of fertilization famil-
iar to knowers with no more science knowledge 
than they received in grade-school sex educa-
tion. A more technical area shows that sexism 
can deeply undermine a whole field of study: the 
evolutionary study of the female orgasm evinces 
androcentrism, in Elisabeth Lloyd’s analysis 
(2005). Resisting sexism that can be identified as 
part of accepted standards of inquiry does not 
require abandoning all accepted methods. 
However, it does require questioning how these 
methods operate in specified contexts, from 
broadly cultural to narrowly academic domains.
In both academic microbiology and sex edu-
cation for children and adolescents, the por-
trayed relationship between egg and sperm in 
the process of fertilization reflects androcen-
trism and other sexist values and is often treated 
as a fairy-tale romantic courtship. Images of the 
egg or ovum range from whoring to dutiful 
wifehood (The Biology and Gender Study 
Group, 1988) and even to hunted prey (Martin, 
1991). At the same time, the sperm appears as a 
victorious hero reminiscent of characters in the 
Odyssey or the Aeneid (The Biology and 
Gender Study Group, 1988). Even using the 
term “fertilization” to name the process that can 
be more accurately described as “cellular 
fusion” assumes an asymmetry in activity 
(Longino, 1997). These models attribute to the 
male sperm cell an active role that invokes 
social norms of masculinity and attribute to the 
female ovum a passive role. Both genderings 
receive reinforcement from explicitly gendered 
imagery and go far beyond the very limited 
“sex” we can attribute to a single cell.3
The feminist empiricist response to sexism in 
the content of science is to scrutinize the inter-
play among metaphors, values, and evidence: 
“think through a particular field and try to 
understand just what its unstated and fundamen-
tal assumptions are and how they influence the 
course of inquiry” (Longino, 1987, p. 62). It is 
not to demand that the egg’s activity be con-
ceived in aggressive terms, which would only 
play into stereotypes of femme fatales and 
devouring mothers. Even equalitarian metaphors 
may be problematic insofar as they encourage 
us to anthropomorphize cells, argues Emily 
Martin (1991):
Although the scientific convention is to call such 
metaphors “dead,” they are not so much dead as 
sleeping, hidden within the scientific content of 
texts—and all the more powerful for it. Waking up 
such metaphors, by becoming aware of when we are 
projecting cultural imagery onto what we study, will 
improve our ability to investigate and understand 
nature. Waking up such metaphors, by becoming 
aware of their implications, will rob them of their 
power to naturalize our social conventions about 
gender. (p. 501)
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For instance, we must beware how anthropo-
morphizing gametes attributes intentionality—
purposes and feelings—to the egg and sperm. 
Intervening in defense of such nominal “per-
sons” on the basis of metaphorical understand-
ing might include technological and legal 
interventions against the will or interest of the 
very real people who produce these cells (Martin, 
1991). A range of social and moral views, and 
actions that science informs, can become loaded 
with undesirable social assumptions and pro-
jected ideals.
By contrast with the breadth and variability 
in sexist presentations of fertilization, Lloyd 
(2005) identifies two specific assumptions in 
the evolutionary science of the female orgasm: 
androcentrism and adaptationism. Androcen-
trism is being male centered or, more specifi-
cally in the case of sexuality, assuming that 
females are like males (pp. 1–2), and adapta-
tionism is “commitment to finding adaptive 
explanations of a trait” (p. 14). The assumption 
that males are standard or ideal is evident in 
every available evolutionary account of the 
female orgasm, in all of the 21 accounts that 
Lloyd studies, and the assumption that all traits 
are adaptations is present in 20 of these. Each of 
the 21 theories fails to apply methodological, 
logical, and evidential standards with which 
their researchers are perfectly familiar and 
which they otherwise accept (pp. 17–18, 221–222). 
Adhering to these standards would prevent the 
ubiquitous mismatching of the hypotheses with 
the available evidence, a disconnect that reflects 
androcentrism and adaptationism (p. 20). In 
studies of the female orgasm, bad science has 
been science as usual.
Whereas the feminist empiricist analysis of 
fertilization directly addresses social complex-
ity and scrutinizes political implications, Lloyd’s 
analysis is much more constrained, restricted to 
analyzing the methodological inadequacies of 
this particular field. She “leaves undeveloped 
some of the most interesting issues, including 
the social significance of the science of orgasm, 
the adequacy and limitation of sexology data 
in the description of orgasm, and the role of femi-
nist approaches to science beyond merely con-
trolling for sexist bias” (Meynell, 2007, p. 219). 
The contrast illustrates Sandra Harding’s dis tin c-
tion between “sophisticated” and “spontaneous” 
or “naïve” feminist empiricism. Whereas Lloyd’s 
study exemplifies spontaneous feminist empiri-
cism by focusing narrowly on standards of 
testing, most feminist empiricists—more 
“sophisticatedly”—attend to the dynamics between 
theory generation and theory testing, and so to 
the generation of testing standards and their 
cultural impact.4
Deferring to existing scientific practices to 
weed out sexism is a strategy defended by Sharyn 
Clough (2003). She argues that feminists should 
attend to the local empirical standards of spe-
cific sciences and debates and avoid vain 
attempts to specify the general roles that values 
have in science. To ask general questions about 
epistemological justification and to seek a uni-
versal epistemology opens the door to questions 
that lead to global skepticism or universal doubt. 
We will be unable to claim knowledge of any 
kind if we demand one theory of knowledge to 
cover all types of understanding should we fail 
to develop one that succeeds.
Clough’s rejection of broad conceptions of 
knowledge is fairly unique, but many feminist 
empiricists agree with her on the value of local-
ized strategies. Helen Longino (1987), in her clas-
sic article “Can There Be a Feminist science?” 
advises inquirers to refrain from attempting to 
anticipate the ultimate shape of feminist science:
Accountability [to feminist concerns] does not 
demand a radical break with the science one has 
learned and practiced. The development of a “new” 
science involves a more dialectical evolution and 
more continuity with established science than the 
familiar language of scientific revolutions implies. 
(Longino, 1987, p. 61) 
What remains is to “do science as a feminist”: 
employ the methods and methodologies that 
help to address the feminist concerns relevant to 
that particular area of inquiry. Code (2008) also 
advises modest goals: 
Reconsider the value of the small: of small 
projects that speak specifically from a careful 
understanding to and about the precise circum-
stances of a particular species, community, group, 
or society, and are understood well enough to 
make such speaking responsibly knowledgeable. 
(p. 199)
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Such localized engagement of feminist concerns 
raises profound challenges to the way that episte-
mology and empiricism have operated in the past.
themes in Feminist empiricism
Feminist revisions of empiricism focus on two 
related themes: epistemic values and epistemic 
agency. First, sociopolitical values have cogni-
tive or epistemic implications and help to war-
rant beliefs and theories, argue feminist 
empiricists. Defying the traditional distinction 
between epistemic and political values raises 
questions for feminist empiricists about the sig-
nificance of communities for knowledge. For 
some feminist empiricists, not the individual 
person but instead the community is the locus of 
knowledge. For all, the agent or the knowing 
subject is no longer the isolated abstract indi-
vidual that was identified in earlier epistemolo-
gies of the global North, a challenge that provides 
the second theme in feminist empiricism.
What Do We Want? Epistemic  
and Political Values
Feminist empiricist analysis considers the 
interplay among various forms of values or theo-
retical virtues: empirical values, such as predic-
tive accuracy or testability; other epistemic values, 
such as simplicity; and non-epistemic values, from 
subjective or personal values to moral or ethical 
values and more broadly political or cultural val-
ues. In this section, I will explain the standardly 
recognized empirical and epistemic values and 
the arguments by feminist empiricists that they 
are not sufficient to eliminate the political content 
of scientific theory. Considering the interplay of 
non-epistemic with epistemic values not only 
explains observations of sexism in science but 
also suggests various roles that feminist values 
might take in science. There is little agreement 
regarding how scientists and knowers more gen-
erally should integrate feminist values as part of 
their methods of inquiry. Yet the feminist cri-
tiques of science have provided ample evidence 
that feminist practice and values improve scien-
tific knowledge.
The most generally accepted of the cognitive 
or epistemological values has been truth, which 
carries realist metaphysical assumptions of an 
independent exterior world or at least a repre-
sentationalist view of mind. To avoid such 
metaphysical implications, most empiricist phi-
losophers of science follow Quine and Thomas 
Kuhn (1977), who speak instead of truth about 
empirical adequacy, which includes predictive 
accuracy and retrodictive accuracy (explaining 
past observations). Likewise, facticity, rationality, 
evidence, and objectivity are values that provide 
standards for scientific testing and evaluation. 
The operation of these general epistemological 
values is the central concern for feminist empir-
icists, a project that complements feminist 
standpoint theorists’ concern with heuristics and 
the generation of ideas.5 
Many feminist and not specifically feminist 
empiricists (explicitly Longino and Miriam 
Solomon) hope to steer a middle course between 
traditional empiricism and the social construc-
tivism of the Strong Programme in the sociology 
of science that is sometimes read into early Kuhn 
(1962). The logical empiricists recognized that 
political matters and social and subjective inspi-
ration affect how theories are generated. Yet they 
argued that processes of testing or of rational 
theory choice using distinctly epistemic values 
eliminate those influences and distinguish views 
with purely epistemological authority. 
Contemporary empiricists, whether or not 
they identify as feminist, maintain that general 
epistemic values such as evidence or rationality 
are manifested or articulated in scientific practice 
in the form of the following more specific quali-
ties of theories or beliefs: ontological simplicity 
(Ockham’s razor), modesty, internal coherence, 
external consistency (including theoretical con-
servatism), predictability, explanatory power 
(also described as unifying power, generality, or 
breadth of scope), testability (also described as 
refutability or predictive accuracy), and theoreti-
cal fruitfulness (or fertility). Thus, following 
Quine and Thomas Kuhn, values receive general 
acceptance from (mainstream) empiricist philos-
ophy of science.
Whichever of the cognitive values make up the 
basis for scientific evaluation, the list is never 
exhaustive for contemporary empiricists, nor can 
the individual values be applied in a straightfor-
ward algorithmic manner. Rarely do we find con-
sensus among theorists about which values are 
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important or how to apply them, or even how to 
weigh them against each other. Theoretical fertility 
or productivity, for instance, can be interpreted in 
different ways by different investigators and in the 
context of different research programs—we may 
ask “fruitful for what?” Also, fruitfulness may be 
weighted in various ways relative to the other cog-
nitive values (Rooney, 1993), as both Kuhn and 
Quine recognize. For instance, the detailed focus 
necessary for an accurate account clearly conflicts 
with the applicability of that account to a range of 
phenomena in a range of situations that constitutes 
breadth of scope (Longino, 1997).
Feminists differ from other contemporary 
empiricists in arguing that how we identify, 
interpret, and weigh cognitive values also 
reflects political commitments (whether we real-
ize this or not). “Responsibility and accountabil-
ity requirements join verifiability high on the 
epistemic agenda as epistemic and moral-politi-
cal issues coalesce and as statements of fact take 
on a less self-evidently factual demeanour” 
(Code, 2006a, p. 128). Scientific method and 
rational theory choice—articulated in terms of 
predictive success, observation independence, 
and explanatory power, by Richmond Campbell 
(1997, pp. 25–27)—are not sufficient to elimi-
nate sociopolitical influences.
[T]here are standards of rational acceptability that 
are independent of particular interests and values 
but . . . satisfaction of these standards by a theory 
or hypothesis does not guarantee that the theory or 
hypothesis in question is value- or interest-free. 
(Longino, 1990, p. 12)
Consider how gender roles influence cellular 
biology and androcentrism influences evolu-
tionary biology, as I described previously, and 
how racism has informed the study of intelli-
gence (Gould, 1996). Such non-epistemological 
values from the context of theory generation 
remain present in those theories that succeed.
Testing only shows a claim to be epistemically 
superior among the available contending theories, 
so the process can entrench sociopolitical values 
in scientific practice, as Kathleen Okruhlik argues:
If [the available] theories have been generated by 
males operating in a deeply sexist culture, then it 
is likely that they will all be contaminated by sexism. 
Non-sexist rivals will never even be generated. 
Hence the theory which is selected by the canons 
of scientific appraisal will simply be the best of 
the sexist rivals; and the very content of science 
will be sexist, no matter how rigorously we apply 
objective standards of assessment in the context of 
justification. In fact, the best of the sexist theories 
will emerge more and more highly confirmed after 
successive tests. (Okruhlik, 1994, pp. 34–35)
Social ideology and sociopolitical values play as 
substantial a role as “stereotypically scientific 
issues of evidence and logic” in scientific 
knowledge (Longino, 1990, p. 3). Both science 
in general or “as usual” and particular cases of 
incompetent or “bad” science involve more than 
purely cognitive or logical concerns.
A more complicated example of the intermin-
gling of political with epistemic values is 
Longino’s feminist defense of a social-cognitive 
model over the linear-hormonal, or “biological 
determinist,” model for gendered differences in 
human physical and cognitive behavior. No 
purely cognitive or epistemic decision between 
the two models seems available according to 
Longino’s original (1990) analysis, but the values 
of theoretical unification and simplicity that sup-
port the linear-hormonal model cannot be viewed 
only in cognitive terms. Part of the constitutive 
force of “simplicity” in this model is due to the 
operation of gender dimorphism as part of the 
motivation for the very understanding of biologi-
cal determinism itself, although gender dimor-
phism is biologically contested (Rooney, 1993, 
p. 18). Gender dimorphism, which is assuming 
that bodies take two distinctly gendered forms, 
offers the valued “simplicity” in this case because 
of its resonance with existing social hierarchies; 
so it seemed rationally preferable because it was 
socially preferred.
Likewise feminist interests support certain 
cognitive values over others, and empiricism can 
support the role of feminist politics in good sci-
entific practice (Campbell, 1998). Yet, feminist 
empiricists do not advocate any specific method-
ologies, and some refuse to search for definitive 
general criteria for evaluating the content of 
knowledge, even specifically scientific knowl-
edge. Instead of viewing science as a product, 
Longino urges that we treat it as a practice, that 
feminist science is not an abstract ideal but a 
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matter of “doing science as a feminist” (Longino, 
1990, p. 188). “We can . . . fashion and favor 
research programs that are consistent with the 
values and commitments we express in the rest 
of our lives” (Longino, 1990, p. 191).
The feminist critiques of science have revealed 
certain patterns in valuation, a constellation of 
theoretical values that Longino has started to 
catalog (1997). Like the traditional empirical 
values, the feminist set begins with empirical ade-
quacy or accuracy. This accepted epistemic value 
supports a specifically feminist value: “to reveal 
both gender in the phenomena and gender bias in 
the accounting of them” (Longino, 1997, p. 45). 
The value of revealing gender is served by nov-
elty, ontological heterogeneity, and mutuality of 
interaction in the content of theories and research 
programs. These values are neither uniquely nor 
intrinsically feminist, which holds also for val-
ues of concern to feminists that are not (or are 
only distantly) connected to empirical adequacy: 
applying science to meet current human needs, 
such as those traditionally ministered by women, 
and diffusing scientific power by encouraging 
general access and participation in science 
(Longino, 1997, pp. 50–51). The feminist values 
may complement the more standard set or provide 
alternatives. For instance, ontological heteroge-
neity conflicts with an ontological interpretation 
of (standardly valued) simplicity.
The necessity for sociopolitical values in sci-
ence implies that nastier—sexist, racist, and so 
forth—sociopolitical values could be justified 
and are part of not just bad science but science as 
usual. Criticizing the role of such values makes it 
difficult to support a positive role for feminist 
values in knowledge, a problem described by 
Louise Antony as the “bias paradox.”6 Yet some 
political values, such as feminism, can be 
revealed to better support empirical adequacy 
than others. “Doing science as a feminist” has 
produced any number of novel and empirically 
successful theories. Early feminist critiques of 
science led, for instance, to recognizing the activ-
ity of the ovum and to developing the “woman-
the-gatherer” hypothesis in anthropology that has 
proved more successful than the previous “man-
the-hunter” alternative (Longino & Doell, 1983). 
This pattern provides evidence of the empirical 
adequacy of at least some feminist values in one 
field at a particular point in its development. 
The success of multiple feminist critiques of 
science indicates that feminism has a general 
empirical adequacy, at least at this point in the 
progress of science. The empirical advantage is 
due, at least in part, to feminist attention to the 
role of values, especially political values, in sci-
ence; these are not generally recognized compo-
nents of epistemology or methodology. “Political 
critique of accepted epistemic values helps reveal 
existing incoherences in our cognitive practices 
and suggests remedial options” (Hundleby, 2002, 
p. 263). A broader base for criticism becomes 
available, as does a broader horizon for action, 
because we consider science to be part of the 
larger community.
A certain number of feminist empiricists, 
notably Lynn Hankinson Nelson, stress that the 
operation of science subjects political values to 
ordinary standards of criticism by which people 
can dismiss them. Naturalists such as Nelson use 
scientific understandings of human knowers to 
account for knowledge, but the standards draw 
from Quine’s broad notion of science, which incor-
porates the richness of commonsense reasoning 
that can be used as a basis for criticism (Nelson, 
1990). Perhaps the most general value that 
requires attention from naturalists is the value of 
human survival (Code, 1996) because that value 
underpins human nature according to evolution-
ary biology. The moral and sociopolitical values 
dismissed by Quine for being the result of natu-
ral selection are vindicated by those origins, 
according to Nelson. She argues that their evolu-
tionary success provides scientific reason to 
consider the values cognitively good: they meet 
the common practical needs of societies and of 
humanity (Nelson, 1990, p. 133). We may use 
these same standards to evaluate which moral 
and sociopolitical values have empirical value.
Because it reconfigures the role of bias in sci-
ence, there is no need to distinguish between 
good and bad bias in Miriam Solomon’s “social 
empiricism” (2001). She replaces the traditional 
epistemological distinction between epistemic or 
rational (“cold”) and non-epistemic or biasing 
(“hot”) factors in how scientists decide among 
theories with an account of empirical and non-
empirical decision vectors. Empirical decision 
vectors include salience of data, availability of 
data, egocentric bias toward one’s own data (non-
cognitive—but driven by data!), and preference 
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for a theory that generates novel predictions. 
Non-empirical decision vectors include ideology, 
pride, conservativeness, radicalism, elegance, 
competitiveness, and peer pressure; the list goes 
on and so includes much more than the sociopo-
litical values addressed by other feminist empiri-
cists. Solomon argues that all sorts of personal 
and social values can be part of the motivation 
behind states of science that are justified. It is the 
appropriate social distribution of decision vec-
tors that makes a scientific decision rational, not 
whether any particular vectors are present. The 
only relevant distinction among values is whether 
they are empirical.
Solomon bucks intuition and argues that 
dissent—and not consensus—is the scientific 
norm, in the sense of being the more common 
and general state of science. Rational dissent 
occurs under the following circumstances:
 1. All theories under consideration have some 
empirical success (explain some observations).
 2. All empirical vectors are distributed propor-
tionately to the empirical success of each theory 
(productive scientific methods fall under theo-
ries proportional to their empirical success).
 3. The nonempirical vectors are equally distributed.
Dissent occurs more frequently than consensus 
partly because only a very specific configuration 
of the decision vectors can justify consensus.7 
Forming consensus is only appropriate when all 
the empirical success supports one theory, mak-
ing it a limiting case of dissent.
Thus Solomon, like Nelson, maintains that 
we can assess the scientific significance of moral 
and sociopolitical values. Such an assessment 
will only proceed in the long term, however.
Epistemic practices at their best proceed according 
to (interim) standards derived from collaborative 
efforts to produce the best possible investigations, 
descriptions, and understandings, where “best” 
includes an ongoing self-reflexive and negotiative 
commitment to determining and trying out norms 
and standards, and evaluating their effectiveness 
and failures. (Code, 2008, p. 194)
While we wait for more evidence to come in, we 
have some reason to favor feminist values. 
“Doing science as a feminist” is thus an open-
ended practice.
Who Knows? Epistemic Agency
Traditional empiricists viewed the agent of 
knowledge as an individual person who has the 
same sorts of rational capabilities as other per-
sons, a laudably equalitarian account but one 
that masks real differences among knowers. 
Individual people have different resources for 
understanding in accordance with their social 
location, their socialization, and their develop-
mental history. Addressing these variables 
requires a more social account of the epistemic 
agent, and feminist empiricists disagree about 
what that account should be; they even consider 
that different models of epistemic agency pro-
vide the desired purchase on different projects of 
inquiry (Code, 2006a). 
Feminists have transformed the empiricist 
concept of the knowing subject through various 
forms of attention to how individuals depend on 
communities for knowledge. I will present their 
accounts beginning with the most individualistic 
and proceeding through degrees of sociality 
toward the most communal account, and then to 
one that disrupts feminist dependence on the 
notion of community. To start, the traditional view 
of individuals as agents of knowledge as revised 
by Heidi Grasswick (2004) becomes individuals-
in-communities. More radically, granting central 
roles to the community in which individuals are 
only secondary participants and not direct agents, 
Longino and Nelson argue that the practices of 
people coordinated in their communal relation-
ships allow individual experiences to become 
significant. Communal processes qualify individ-
ual beliefs as objective according to Longino 
(1990), and coherence with communal standards 
qualifies individual observations as evidence 
according to Nelson (1990). In Solomon’s “social 
empiricism” (2001), individuals fall completely 
out of the picture of scientific knowledge, because 
scientific rationality only occurs in relationships 
among competing theories, and so only at the 
level of communities. The strength and role of 
communities in knowledge remains highly con-
tested, leading Lorraine Code (1996, 2006a) 
instead to adopt a more flexible concept of society 
to account for the social nature of knowledge.
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Grasswick (2004) rejects the traditional view 
of the atomistic, self-sufficient individual but 
argues that recognizing the (relational, depen-
dent) individual as the agent of knowledge 
remains necessary to make sense of the possibil-
ity of dissent and of how epistemic standards 
become challenged (p. 97). A dynamic model of 
epistemic agency becomes possible when we 
identify agents as individuals-in-communities.
Although Grasswick’s location of epistemic 
agency in individual persons is traditional, her 
notion of the individual as socially dependent is 
transformative. Gone are assumptions that the 
knower has a given set of capacities for rea-
soning because, with Code (1991), Grasswick 
insists that cognitive capacities are shaped by 
psychological development and socialization. 
“Individual knowers become epistemically dif-
ferentiated along the lines of their communal 
histories and memberships” (Grasswick, 2004, 
p. 102). With Code again, Grasswick emphasizes 
the need for trust between people and our depen-
dence on systems of authority. Yet Grass wick’s 
focus on communities goes beyond Code’s con-
cern with interdependence by giving communi-
ties a critical role in the development and 
support of individual understanding.
Grasswick (2004) insists that communities 
provide “standards of evidence and bodies of 
evidence” (p. 96) and that they prioritize some 
epistemic values over others (p. 104), as Longino 
(1990, 2004) and Nelson (1990) have also 
argued. However, Grasswick addresses how 
individuals are each involved in multiple com-
munities that are conflicting, overlapping, and 
vague, a complication that Longino and Nelson 
barely acknowledge. They set aside the com-
plexities of communities to focus on how a com-
munity can operate to provide objectivity and 
evidence for beliefs.
Longino (1990) argues that critical discursive 
communities grant objectivity to the beliefs of 
individuals by constraining individual values. 
“Individual values are held in check not by a 
methodology but by social values” (p. 102). 
Scientific practice is independent of individual 
aims, except that individuals may work toward 
building the appropriate communities, which are 
those that engage a maximal number of different 
points of view. Longino’s social standard for 
assessing the objectivity of scientific discourse 
involves four criteria for critical interpersonal 
engagement. An objective community has the 
following: (1) avenues for the expression and 
diffusion of criticism; (2) uptake of, and response 
to, criticism; (3) public standards by reference to 
which theories and so forth are assessed; and, (4) 
equality of intellectual authority (Longino, 1990, 
1993). Communities that meet these criteria, to 
the extent that they meet the criteria, produce 
objective views that individuals may hold.
As inquirers, we choose, at least to a certain 
extent, the cultures in which we participate, so, 
as feminists, we can choose to whom we are 
accountable, which community will guide our 
beliefs; we can even choose combinations of 
communities. “The feminist scientist is respon-
sive to the ideals of a political community as 
well as to some subset of the standards endorsed 
in her or his scientific community” (Longino, 
1990, p. 192). Longino’s advice to choose a 
feminist community does not entail adopting 
any particular methodology. Nevertheless “doing 
science as a feminist” requires interpreting 
empirical adequacy in terms of the concerns of 
one’s chosen community, as described in the 
previous section on epistemic values.
Similarly, for Nelson, individuals acquire their 
scientific values from communities, but, for her, 
the community plays a more comprehensive role. 
The communal quality of the standards necessary 
for a person to be said to know any particular 
thing entails that some community to which that 
person belongs must be the first and foremost 
agent of knowledge. Individual people do not 
have knowledge or evidence at all except insofar 
as each participates in knowing communities. 
Background beliefs and standards—for example, 
regarding the techniques for collecting evidence 
and how to make inferences from data—that we 
share with other people provide support in vary-
ing degrees for our theories. 
Nelson’s communal view of knowledge fol-
lows from her argument that sociopolitical crite-
ria are among our tools for justifying knowledge 
claims, again as outlined in the previous section. 
The importance of sociopolitical values sug-
gests that community is the primary epistemic 
agent, which also is borne out by some com-
monsense observations. If any one member of a 
community knows something, then some other 
member could also know it—in this limited 
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sense we may be interchangeable. “Acceptable 
answers to the question ‘Who knows?’ include 
‘Everyone,’ ‘All of us,’ ‘Lots of people,’ ‘Many 
of us,’ but only very problematically ‘Only me’” 
(Nelson, 1990, p. 255). Yet, “we know” doesn’t 
mean “I and you and . . . you,” the “we” formed 
from people that each of us knows. Especially in 
“big science,” which brings together people 
with vastly different skills who complete sepa-
rate portions of calculation and experimenta-
tion, no one participant understands it all. So it 
seems that “we” must know before any “I” can 
begin to understand.
Methodologically, for Solomon, as individu-
als we cannot expect nor should we desire to be 
free from bias, even to a degree, though we 
should aim to pursue theories that have empiri-
cal success. We can address the role of nonem-
pirical decision vectors only in social terms. For 
individuals to recognize, assess, and redistribute 
the nonempirical vectors in order to justify the 
state of science requires a range of techniques.
[T]he identification of decision vectors and 
improvement of their distribution . . . typically 
require expertise, and, often, multidisciplinary 
knowledge and skills. The critical training required 
to identify presuppositions about gender, for exam-
ple, is quite different from the psychological train-
ing and methods required to detect cognitive bias. 
And the statistical techniques needed to assess the 
role of birth order are quite different from scientific 
and philosophical knowledge of theoretical con-
straints such as simplicity. (Solomon, 2001, p. 140)
Thus, for Solomon, methodological consider-
ations must be both socially dispersed (as in 
Nelson’s account) and multidisciplinary in order 
to reveal imbalances in political values and 
other nonempirical decision vectors. 
Solomon’s naturalist demand for empirical 
evidence to support epistemological evaluations 
restrains her endorsement of Longino’s recom-
mendation (her fourth criterion for critical 
engagement) that we should join or develop egali-
tarian communities for the sake of improving our 
investigations. Solomon admits that such social 
democratization may benefit the identification of 
political decision vectors. Yet, at best, only politi-
cal decision vectors might receive improved atten-
tion, and we remain without evidence of even that.
Among feminist empiricists, Code stands out 
for resisting commitment to any particular formu-
lation of the epistemic agent and for recognizing 
sources of agency aside from individuals-in-
communities and human communities that 
include our relationship with the biological and 
ecological environment. Although Code treats as 
fundamental the mutual dependence among indi-
viduals by suggesting that knowers are “second 
persons,” a concept borrowed from Annette Baier 
(2002), Code’s account resists any reference to 
communities. She recognizes that knowledge 
also develops in smaller and more fluid social 
contexts—in a “society” that remains less clearly 
defined and correspondingly more flexible than a 
community. Code suggests that we engage in 
“imaginaries” (a notion borrowed from Cornelius 
Castoriadis). Instituted imaginaries provide 
coherence among individual understandings, and 
instituting imaginaries question the social struc-
ture and make new meanings possible (Code, 
2006a, pp. 30–31).
Imaginaries are “habitats” that provide 
“places to know,” Code (2006a) argues, in two 
senses: as places from which we can begin 
inquiry and as places that we must come to 
understand if we are to be responsible knowers. 
Learning about the contexts in which we know is 
central to the methodology of most feminist 
empiricism, and it is integral to naturalized or 
naturalist epistemology. Naturalism treats know-
ers as part of nature, as subject to empirical 
investigation, and thus seeks to use empirical 
evidence especially from science to enrich and 
strengthen epistemological theorizing.
Feminist nAturAlism
Naturalized epistemologists begin with the 
assumption that people actually have knowl-
edge and hence with an implicit rejection of 
global skepticism, the worry that knowledge is 
not at all possible. The means for rejecting skep-
ticism, according to Quine, is to use our science 
itself to provide the explanation of how some 
beliefs are justified, or warranted, over others. 
Final answers regarding standards for inquiry 
are not the goal, however, for thoroughgoing 
naturalists. Such concerns risk begging the 
question about the assumptions underpinning 
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the sciences of cognition and ignoring the ways 
that scientific investigation continues to develop. 
Instead, jumping straight in to work with scien-
tific findings provides a constructive “looping 
effect” as systems of epistemic valuation are 
continuously informed by empirical develop-
ments (Fellows, 2010).
The relevant sciences for Quine are the sci-
ences of individual cognition, behaviorism, and 
neuroscience that some feminist naturalists also 
take up (Antony, 2003; Duran, 1993). Even for 
Quine, further forms of science may shed light 
on how people’s experiences can justify their 
beliefs, and thus his reformed empiricism com-
plements Kuhn’s historicism (Hundleby, 2002). 
Making use of all of our available reso urces to 
scrutinize our understandings reflects natural-
ism’s inspiration by the 18th-century empiri-
cism of David Hume, which Baier (2002) 
argues has a distinctly social cast that suits it for 
feminism (pp. 46–50).
As part of the process of naturalizing episte-
mology, feminists critically analyze the method-
ologies and basic concepts of the contemporary 
cognitive sciences that inform their naturalism—
whether the sciences of individual psychology 
favored by Quine or the Kuhnian and post-
Kuhnian social studies of knowledge. Feminist 
naturalists recognize that the scientific resources 
for epistemology themselves are subject to 
improvement. After all, science is open-ended in 
several different ways due to the open-endedness 
of the future, natural human ingenuity and cre-
ativity, and even the concepts we create (Rooney, 
2003, pp. 218–219). The feminist treatment of 
the scientific resources for theorizing about 
knowledge as dynamic produces “a verb-sense 
of epistemology, . . . a sense of doing epistemol-
ogy, of reflecting in a systematic way on knowl-
edge and knowing while drawing ongoing 
critical attention to particular kinds of motivat-
ing concerns, questions, and methods in the 
way one does epistemology” (p. 207, emphasis 
original). This reflexive development of empiri-
cal standards contrasts with the usual epistemo-
logical pursuit of a “final” view, epistemology as 
a noun: for example, coherentism, positivism, 
empiricism. Such static treatments of knowledge 
become dynamic and defeasible in feminist 
hands, subject to challenge and change over time. 
In the context of transforming claims about what 
counts as knowledge, what remains continuous 
and distinctive in feminist epistemology, and in 
feminist naturalism especially, is ongoing infor-
mation by feminism and by science, even as these 
change over time (Rooney, 2003).
controversies About  
Feminist empiricism
Feminist empiricism rarely receives complimen-
tary treatment in overviews of feminist episte-
mologies and science studies, in large part because 
it has been misunderstood. The theoretical con-
servativeness of empiricism does not entail a 
political conservativeness. The most potentially 
regressive approach to feminist empiricism may 
be naturalism because it defers to scientific input, 
which inevitably reflects the status quo. Yet the 
reflexive revolutionary spirit of naturalism chal-
lenges even its own empiricist precepts.
The Conservative Quality  
of Empiricism 
Naturalism may seem to resist progress in 
several different ways. Some concerns involve 
the critical weakness of naturalism and the patri-
archal content of the science it relies on. Another 
concern is that empirical understanding, natural-
ized or not, can never be sufficient for political 
analysis. Feminist naturalists account for the fact 
that there are always prior epistemologies and 
other existing influences on the ways that we 
evaluate beliefs, and they demand continuous 
scrutiny of these value systems as concrete con-
stitutive circumstances for all our inquiries.
Relying on science, as naturalists do, seems 
to at least limit and perhaps exclude the possi-
bility of establishing new ideals for human rea-
soning, not only because science may employ 
regressive politics but also because formulating 
ideals is not the job of science—it’s the job of 
philosophy. At best, science describes only 
people’s success with respect to accepted ideals, 
without interrogating those standards, deferring 
to existing standards in a way that discourages 
some feminist empiricists, including Longino 
(1993), from naturalism. Further, naturalism’s 
tendency toward scientism—deference to scien-
tific evaluations—may be inherently quietist, 
suppressing dispute. In practice, many of the 
central tenets of science are beyond scrutiny, 
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even though in some ideal forms science may be 
self-revising (Linker, 2003).
The patriarchal social system produces almost 
all of the science available that might provide 
empirical standards for evaluating knowledge 
claims. As a practical political resource, science 
has a history of resisting social explanations for 
gendered differences and seeking instead 
accounts based on biology that portray the dif-
ferences as relatively immutable. The tendency 
in the scientific study of knowledge to accept 
gender as given and ahistorical seems to be espe-
cially strong when women’s capacities have 
been judged to be inferior. Consider that some 
significant gendered differences have been found 
with spatial ability, but the differences are so 
small as to be easily explained by differences in 
socialization. Yet researchers persist in looking 
for biological reasons for gendered differences 
in understanding (Fausto-Sterling, 1985, 1992), 
such that cognitive science seems bent on justi-
fying women’s low social status. Psychologists 
resolutely search for differences, even when 
empirical results consistently reveal gender par-
ity in verbal ability.
For such reasons, taking up scientific accounts 
of gender can be regressive and epistemologi-
cally dubious, especially when it comes to cog-
nition. For instance, scientific accounts of 
cognition support claims made by Jane Duran 
(2001) that women benefit from an especially 
“relational” view of themselves and the world.8 
Duran seems to be among the most thoroughgo-
ing of feminist naturalisms because she engages 
deeply in empirical research in both cognitive 
science (1993) and contemporary cultural stud-
ies (2001). However, that depth is at the expense 
of considering other empirical factors, including 
socialization, that reveal how gender dichoto-
mies in cognition can be symptoms of oppres-
sion. It ignores a competing account that has 
more thorough empirical support, the evidence 
that women are socialized to participate in and 
even facilitate their oppression.
Adherence to the empiricist tradition also can 
be used to rule out the relevance of social libera-
tion movements to fostering advances in science 
(Harding, 1986, pp. 25–26). Thus, empiricism’s 
future can seem to be radical only insofar as its 
internal conflicts spark a move away from the 
empiricism itself. As Maureen Linker argues 
(2003), empirical evidence seems to have little 
impact on the normative correction of many 
forms of human knowledge, such as those 
assessed in terms of logical, linguistic, and moral 
truths.
Yet, feminist empiricism involves accounting 
for the relationship between values traditionally 
considered to be noncognitive—including social 
liberation and morality—and their cognitive 
counterparts, such as empirical adequacy. 
“Experience,” the key concept in empiricism, is 
a very broad and complex notion for feminist 
empiricists that extends beyond and complicates 
simple sensory experience. Cultural resources, 
including some rudimentary prior epistemology, 
inform any empirical knowledge. Our studies in 
psychology and the history of science, for 
instance, cannot move ahead without some 
notion of what needs examination, without a 
functional ontology, an account of the nature of 
the world that shows how meaningful inquiry 
can be possible. Cognitive scientists generally 
assume (1) that knowledge takes the form of 
discrete propositional beliefs regarding isolated 
statements of fact (e.g., “the breadbox is larger 
than the teacup”), (2) that individuals are the 
agents of knowledge, and (3) that science is the 
best example of knowledge. However, “stipula-
tion . . . simply begs the question against more 
robust forms of naturalizing epistemology where 
questions about the cognitive demarcation and 
delineation of beliefs are open to question” 
(Rooney, 2003, p. 216). No scientific authority 
absolves the need to scrutinize background con-
cepts and values, whether they include the sex-
ism of cognitive science or the empirical 
adequacy of psychoanalysis.
Background epistemologies belong to the 
communal resources that Nelson argues are nec-
essary for individual knowledge of any kind. 
Yet her picture of communities as prior to indi-
vidual knowledge seems to entail that what can 
be known is static and that individual knowl-
edge is passive. So Edrie Sobstyl (2004) argues 
that science and common sense are in constant 
flux, and in dynamic interaction with individual 
experience.
This creates opportunities for knowledge to grow 
and change. . . . The fact that women alter their 
behavior in order to avoid being targets of sexual 
assault shows that they recognize the prevailing 
beliefs of a patriarchal community. But the fact 
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that women resist such constraints on their 
behavior and demand freedom from sexual pre-
dation shows that our common sense and gen-
dered social and political experiences have a 
concrete impact on what we know. It is not help-
ful to say that this resistance is entirely derived 
from the community, because our community 
has not been particularly willing to warrant such 
ideals. (p. 131) 
Thus Sobstyl argues that we can revise and 
complete Nelson’s holism by allowing for a 
symmetrical relationship between embodied 
individuals and communities rather than by giv-
ing absolute priority to communities. Individual 
knowledge may be derived from communal 
knowledge, as Nelson argues, or it may be situ-
ated in or interdependent with communal 
knowledge in the way that Grasswick and 
Sobstyl suggest.
There are many reasons to believe that the 
program of naturalizing epistemology will change 
substantially in the future. To begin with, natu-
ralizing epistemology is a project currently in its 
very early stages. Even those who are sympa-
thetic to naturalism or describe themselves as 
naturalists are “slow to renounce the old modes 
of legitimation” (Roth, 2003, p. 296), and what 
the new scientific modes are, exactly, remains 
unclear. In addition, the development of natural-
ism has been slow because naturalists have had 
to spend a good deal of their time defending the 
importance and viability of naturalist techniques 
(Rooney, 2003).
Naturalism is a continuous process, and new 
ways of viewing knowledge constantly emerge 
from the open texture of science, as Rooney 
(2003) argues.
At the very least, I maintain, naturalists must have 
a . . . verb-sense of science—that is, [of] science as 
a diversity of dynamic disciplines, the concepts, 
questions, and findings of which are continually 
being modified in relation to changing conditions, 
including the changing conditions of empirical 
investigation and the changing social and political 
worlds within which such investigation is situated. 
(pp. 218–219) 
New scientific tools may emerge merely because 
science progresses in addressing people’s 
changing concerns and because science may 
respond to new questions that we have about 
knowledge, including feminist questions.
Naturalism Supporting Rationalism
The self-critical impulse in naturalist episte-
mology takes the general form of requiring 
empiricism to be based itself on empirical inves-
tigation. The scientific evidence concerning 
human inquiry thus could turn out to support a 
nonempiricist view of knowledge, to make avail-
able “genuinely novel and transformative philo-
sophical strategies” that explain how bias can 
play a positive role in reasoning (Antony, 2003, 
p. 142). Indeed, some evidence supports the 
rationalist view of mind, harking back to René 
Descartes, that people have native intellectual 
capacities, such as for language, and that, in this 
way, one’s ability to know is independent of 
one’s past experience (Antony, 2003).
On the basis of her rationalist (but naturalisti-
cally supported) view that knowers rely on innate 
mental capacities, Antony adopts the further 
rationalist view that knowers are interchange-
able, which most feminists find objectionable 
because it denies the impact on knowledge of 
developmental history, social situation, and dif-
ferent forms of embodiment. Moreover, the 
bodies that do play a role in Antony’s work and 
that provide one’s perspective on the world do 
not have “bias” in the usual sense that differenti-
ates individuals. The forms of prejudgment that 
are properly called biases at best are merely 
analogous to the shared cognitive dispositions 
that can make our bodies seem interchangeable.
Yet, Antony’s argument demonstrates that 
changes in scientific accounts of cognition could, 
in principle, undermine the traditional empiricist 
view of the mind and the entailed epistemology 
(Campbell, 1998, p. 33). Such a turnabout is pos-
sible because developing scientific perspectives on 
knowledge is an ongoing activity, and this is a 
further reason to view naturalism in a “verb-sense” 
(Rooney, 2003). One may practice epistemologi-
cal naturalism continuously, and ongoing natural-
ist revision entails that feminist empiricists may 
find themselves engaging in quite different forms 
of theorizing than that with which they started. 
Naturalizing is never complete because epistemol-
ogy is never finally, ultimately naturalized.
Empiricism remains, at the moment and for 
the foreseeable future, a viable starting place or 
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background epistemology for naturalist methods. 
Antony’s argument does not succeed in its attempt 
to turn naturalism toward rationalism. Admittedly, 
a rationalist view of the mind—for example, the 
view of Descartes or Noam Chomsky—might 
reflect some evidence better than the behaviorism 
that Quine favored. Even Quine considers behav-
iorist psychology useful only for individuating 
belief states. Behaviorism is not sufficient support 
for epistemology because behaviors are neither the 
same as beliefs nor sufficient to explain them—a 
task for which he suggests biology, especially 
neurophysiology (Nelson, 1990, pp. 126–128).
Naturalist explanation must also account for 
the impact of different social situations and dif-
ferent bodies with various levels and forms of 
cognitive development (Code, 2006a), something 
only promised by Anthony’s rationalism and not 
delivered. These nonbehavioral factors affect 
neurophysiology, including language develop-
ment (Nelson, 1990, pp. 286–287), and so have 
implications not only for Quinean empiricism but 
also for any rationalism that is accountable to 
empirical evidence. The need to address how the 
social world impacts evidence inspired Quine’s 
argument for naturalism (Nelson, 1990, p. 288; 
Quine, 1960). Therefore, to ignore social influ-
ences, as Antony’s rationalist move does, is to 
depart from the basic spirit of naturalism rather 
than to defeat it on its own terms.
conclusion
Employing empiricism provides feminists with 
valuable purchase in the dominant culture and 
access to the power of scientific resources. These 
advantages imbue empiricism with a radical 
potential that both critics of feminist empiricism 
(Harding, 1986) and defenders of it (Campbell, 
1998; Nelson, 1990) recognize to include strate-
gic rhetoric and to go far beyond rhetorical sig-
nificance. Further, supporters argue that feminist 
naturalism demonstrates the radical future of 
feminist empiricism because it holds all the 
strengths of the early alternative approaches 
known as feminist standpoint theory and femi-
nist postmodernism. Feminist naturalism, spe-
cifically, provides clear grounds for evaluating 
not only beliefs but also values and practices 
that include poli tical views (Tuana, 1992). The 
broad scope of naturalist critique allows Antony 
to find in it potential support for rationalism, 
showing that, not only in principle but also in 
practice, naturalism has revolutionary potential.
Naturalism’s open-endedness suggests further 
that feminist empiricism may be mutually com-
plementary with other feminist epistemologies, 
and encourages treating epistemological choices 
as provisional, according to the problem at hand, 
rather than as definitive. Looking to “small” 
places in Code’s ecological manner requires a 
dynamic sensitivity, strategizing as activists:
Choos[e] . . . points of concentration, of focus; 
discern . . . the gaps where intervention and con-
testation have the best hopes of entering, and 
work . . . to ensure that their effects will 
spread . . . [A]ctivists, both singly and collectively, 
have to know a lot just to see what might be pos-
sible and may have to develop strategic compro-
mises to be able to work toward sometimes distant 
and often unstable goals. (Code, 2008, p. 201)
Methodologies may be taken up as guerrilla 
strategies based on shared oppositional con-
sciousness that “operates like the clutch of an 
automobile: the mechanism that permits the 
driver to select, engage, and disengage gears in 
a system for the transmission of power” 
(Sandoval, 1991, p. 14). This U.S. third world 
feminist strategy identified by Chela Sandoval 
encourages flexibility in taking up the compet-
ing political tactics of liberal, Marxist, radical, 
and socialist feminism, and it denies the need to 
commit to a final strategy. Likewise, shifting 
among empiricist and other methodologies 
keeps inquirers free from the stagnation of any 
static epistemology. So feminist empiricism 
continues its radical progression by transform-
ing from a hegemonic strategy into a “proces-
sual relationship” (Sandoval, 1991, p. 24) with 
only tentative “places to know” (Code, 2006a). 
Although Code’s account most clearly sup-
ports recognizing as provisional the naturalist 
employment of empiricism or of any other epis-
temology, her view resonates with other forms 
of feminist empiricism. Consider that because 
different methodologies and epistemologies, 
including rationalism, have some empirical sup-
port, Solomon would advise methodological 
dissent. Keeping different options at hand also 
serves Rooney’s “verb-sense” of epistemology 
that recognizes the open-endedness of human 
42–•–PART I  FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE BUILDING
inquiry. Finally, this pluralism can be expressed 
without assuming naturalism: Longino’s (1990, 
2004) requirement of ongoing critical engage-
ment among divergent perspectives can apply to 
feminist epistemologies and methodologies as 
much as it does to science itself:
The feminist interventions I imagine will be local 
(i.e., specific to a particular area of research), they 
may not be exclusive (i.e., different feminist per-
spectives may be represented in theorizing), and 
they will be in some way continuous with existing 
scientific work. (Longino, 1987, p. 62)
There is no one feminist empiricism, but many 
feminist empiricisms, an epistemological plu-
rality that can be justified—both politically and 
epistemologically and from an individual and a 
community level—according to the various 
views of feminist empiricists.
Discussion Questions
 1. How might a feminist empiricist view of evi-
dence or objectivity apply beyond the domain 
of science to everyday knowledge? Consider 
how a feminist empiricist would shop for gro-
ceries or plant a garden.
 2. How might scientists apply Code’s view of 
ecological thinking?
 a. Grasswick’s notion of knowers as individuals-
in-communities may be a helpful starting 
point. How might a scientist present herself 
as an individual-in-communities? How 
might social scientists view their subjects as 
individuals-in-communities? Will this vary 
with the level at which we recognize socie-
ties or communities?
 b. What other aspects of scientists and subjects 
of study must we address to achieve eco-
logical thinking? Is this different for differ-
ent fields of inquiry?
 3. What do you think are the particular strengths 
and weaknesses of feminist empiricism? Why 
might it be useful to distinguish feminist 
empiricism from other feminist epistemolo-
gies in some contexts but not in others? Social 
contexts? Historical contexts? Geographical 
contexts? Regarding some knowers but not 
others? Different bodies?
 4. Might the different epistemologies work better 
in addressing different forms of research? 
Different methodologies? Different disciplines? 
Different research topics?
Online Resources
The Thinking Meat Project—Explaining Female 
Orgasm: An Interview With Elisabeth Lloyd
http://thinkingmeat.com/newsblog/?page_id=1201
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://plato.stanford.edu/
This open-source encyclopedia features articles by 
experts in specific fields that are periodically updated.
•	 Anderson, E., Feminist epistemology and 
philosophy of science, March 16, 2011, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-
epistemology/ 
•	 Fehr, C., Feminist philosophy of biology, 
June 22, 2011, forthcoming, Fall 2011 edi-
tion, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/femi-
nist-philosophy-biology/
Many feminist empiricists, especially 
Fausto-Sterling, Lloyd, and Longino, have 
made impor tant contributions to the philos-
ophy of biology.
•	 Garry, A., Analytic feminism, April 29, 2004, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/femap 
proach-analytic/
Feminist empiricism can be viewed as the 
epistemological wing of analytic feminism, 
given that empiricism has been the central 
epistemology and essential to the prevalence 
of the “analytic” approach in 20th-century 
Anglo-American philosophy.
•	 Stanford, K., Underdetermination of scientific 
theory, August 12, 2009, http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/
index.html
This theory associated with Quine’s natural-
ism explains the interrelation of epistemic 
and non-epistemic values for many feminist 
empiricists.
•	 Whipps, J., Pragmatist feminism, July 9, 
2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/femap 
proach-pragmatism/
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Feminist empiricists engage with pragma-
tist philosophy primarily through the works 
of Quine, but other feminists engage differ-
ent elements and authors in the pragmatist 
tradition.
Relevant Journals
Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society
Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, 
Culture, and Policy
notes
1. Speaking broadly of the global North is not to 
deny the variability within this historical culture, and 
is a somewhat artificial description, but it helps to 
track connections among the various manifestations 
and implications of European colonization and con-
temporary capitalism.
2. The connections between empiricism and lib-
eralism may be deeper than a mere analogy, as Steven 
Shapin and Simon Schaffer suggest in Leviathan and 
the Air-Pump (1989). 
3. Although social gender and biological sex are 
deeply integrated, distinguishing them is valuable for 
addressing the more flexible social and political 
influences. Furthermore, the sex of an organism as a 
whole has no necessary or sufficient connection with 
an aspect or portion of the body. Not even chromo-
somes or genitalia sex a body.
4. Lloyd’s failure to consider such implications 
led to some misunderstanding of the intentions behind 
her research, which she has remedied in follow-up 
articles by addressing its ramifications for women’s 
sexuality. See the interview with Lloyd listed in the 
“Online Resources” section of this chapter.
5. Practices of testing and evaluation as well as 
the standards of factuality, evidence, and objectivity 
are part of the “context of justification” in traditional 
empiricism, providing epistemic justification or war-
rant. By contrast, heuristics and theory generation 
that concern standpoint theorists are considered part 
of the “context of discovery.”
6. Harding (1986) similarly criticized early or 
“spontaneous” forms of feminist empiricism for 
maintaining that social values both matter and do not 
matter in science.
7. When there is consensus, dissent approaches zero, 
and the conditions (1) through (3) are met as follows:
1. One theory has all the empirical successes 
(explains all the different observations); 
2. All the empirical vectors support that the-
ory (productive scientific methods all fall 
under the theory).
3. With maintained consensus, nonempirical 
decision vectors all begin to support the 
one theory.
8. Duran bases her view of the feminine self on 
object-relations theory, which generally falls under 
feminist standpoint theory (Harding, 1986), but she 
aims to develop a naturalist version.
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